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TOWARD PROSECUTION OF IRAQI CRIMES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: JURISPRUDENTIAL
FOUNDATIONS AND JURISDICTIONAL CHOICES
Louis REN9 BERES*
Between October 1943 and January 1944, the United States and Great
Britain, bowing to rising pressure for post-war punishment of "Hitlerite
Criminals," worked to establish a United Nations Commission for the
Investigation of War Crimes (commonly known as the United Nations War
Crimes Commission-UNWCC). 1  Once established, the Commission,
meeting in London in 1944, assembled lists of war criminals and planned for
the creation of special war crimes tribunals. As is now well-known, the
special trial of major Nazi leaders began in November 1945, a little more
than three months after victorious allied powers authorized proceedings in
their London Charter of August 8, 1945.
Today, shocked by evidence of Iraqi atrocities against civilians2 and
combatants of diverse nationalities, a victorious coalition should soon begin
preparations for what amounts to "another Nuremberg." Animated by the
original trials for crimes of war,3 crimes against peace and crimes against
humanity,4 and by the associated ancient principle of nullum crimen sine
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1. B. SMITH, THE ROAD TO NUREMBERG 10 (1981).
2. Pursuant to the 1949 Geneva Convention, Article 3, civilians are "[plersons taking no
active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause . .
" Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
3. Today, the laws of war, the rules ofjus in bello, comprise: (1) laws on weapons; (2) laws
on warfare; and (3) humanitarian rules. Codified primarily at the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, and known thereby as the law of the Hague and the law of Geneva, these rules
attempt to bring discrimination, proportionality and military necessity into belligerent
calculations. On the main corpus ofjus in bello, see Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, With Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S.
No. 539, 1 Bevans 631 (known commonly as the "Hague Regulations"); Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75
U. N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra
note 2.
4. It is important to note here that the Genocide Convention proscribes conduct that is
juristically distinct from other forms of prohibited wartime killing. Killing involves acts
constituting crimes of war and crimes against humanity. Although crimes against humanity are
linked to wartime actions, the crime of genocide can be committed in peacetime or during a war.
According to Article 1 of the Genocide Convention: "The Contracting Parties confirm that
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international
law which they undertake to prevent and to punish." Convention on the Prevention and
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poena (no crime without a punishment), this coalition too would have to
make some difficult judgments. Among these decisions are important legal
questions of precedent, jurisdiction, and scope (just how broadly among the
Iraqi armed forces and political leadership should the prosecutorial net of
criminal indictments be cast), not to mention enormously complex questions
of custody and criminal procedure.
How should the coalition begin? Led by the United States, which was also
the dominant national force in Nuremberg, the partners must now create a
specially constituted agency endowed with organizational form, centralized
direction and expert legal counsel.5 Resembling the war-crimes planning
group fashioned in the War Department after allied defeat of the Third
Reich, this agency would be charged with the tasks of drafting basic
documents, framing pertinent criminal indictments, and preparing courtroom
prosecutions.
With coalition forces fully absent from Iraq, identification would be
overwhelmingly difficult and custody will require formal extradition requests
to Baghdad and possibly other Arab capitals. Needless to say, such requests
are unlikely to be honored.6
As of late September 1991, there was considerable talk of a return of
coalition military forces to Iraq. Although the rationale of such a return
would be to ensure Iraqi compliance with authoritative cease-fire expecta-
tions-especially as they concern disarming Baghdad of weapons of mass
Punishment of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force for the United
States Feb. 23, 1989).
5. From the point of view of the United States, the Nuremberg obligations to bring major
Iraqi criminals to trial are, in a sense, doubly binding. This is because these obligations
represent not only current obligations under international law, but also the higher-law obligations
found in the American political tradition. By their codification of the principle that basic human
rights in war and in peace are now peremptory, the Nuremberg obligations reflect perfect
convergence between international law and the enduring foundation of our American Republic.
6. In the late nineteenth century, a principle of granting asylum to those whose crimes were
political was established in Europe and in Latin America. This principle is known as the
political offense exception to extradition. Under current international law, however, genocide
and genocide-type crimes are specifically excluded from the realm of the political, and it is
illegal to grant asylum to alleged perpetrators of such crimes. It follows that states that might
grant Saddam Hussein asylum (possible candidates are Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, Sudan and
Mauritania) would be in grievous violation of binding international rules. See Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 4 art. 7; Convention on
the Nonapplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, art.
3, G.A. Res. 2392, U.N. Doc. A/7342, (1968); Principles of International Cooperation in the
Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, art. 4 and 7, G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. Doc. A.9326, (1973); Declaration on
Territorial Asylum, art. 1(2), G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 81, U.N. Doc.
A/6716 (1968); International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, art. 4(b), G.A. Res. 30687, U.N. Doc. A/9233/ADDI-3, (1973); and the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949, Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 3, art. 49 and 50; Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 2 art. 129; Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 3, art. 146. The provisions of the four Geneva
Conventions stem from the maxim aut dedere aut punire, i.e., either a State must extradite or
make sure that a criminal is punished in its own municipal court proceedings.
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destruction-a reinserted multinational force (or even a U.S. military force
under U.N. auspices) could be used to identify and apprehend alleged Iraqi
criminals. From a jurisprudential perspective, of course, it would be entirely
proper to reintroduce appropriate military forces for the sole purpose of such
identification and apprehension (subject, of course, to the norms of jus in
bello), but this is unlikely for both tactical and political reasons.
Ideally, apprehension of Saddam Hussein and his military leaders would be
made possible via the established mechanisms of extradition or prosecution
and the associated means of "indirect enforcement" (prosecution within
authoritative municipal courts in the absence of a permanently-constituted
international criminal court or ad hoc, Nuremberg-style tribunal), but these
prospects are extremely remote. Other possibilities include in absentia trials
and custody via abduction.
Regarding in absentia trials, the terms of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, annexed to the London Agreement, are valid: "The
Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a person charged
with crimes set out in Article 6 of this Charter [crimes against peace; war
crimes and crimes against humanity7] in his absence, if he has not been
found or if the Tribunal, for any reason, finds it necessary, in the interests
of justice, to conduct the hearing in his absence.""
Regarding custody by abduction, two discrete issues present themselves:
(1) seizure of hostes humani generis (common enemy of mankind) when
custody cannot be obtained via extradition; and (2) seizure of hostes humani
generis who is a sitting head of state. On the first issue, we may consider
that President Reagan, in 1986, authorized procedures for the forcible
7. Crimes of War, Crimes Against Peace and Crimes Against Humanity are defined in The
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472,
82. U.N.T.S. 279 defines Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
at art. 6(a), (b) and (c) as follows:
(a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of
a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplish-
ment of any of the foregoing;
(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation
to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing
of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities,
towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) Crimes Against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
8. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 7, art. 12., 59 Stat. 1544,
82 U.N.T.S. 279.
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abduction of suspected terrorists from other states for trial in U.S. courts.'
The statutory authority for President Reagan's posture, however, was
contingent upon the terrorist acts being involved with taking U.S. citizens
hostage-acts that are subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts under the Act
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking."0 In
1987, in international waters, the F.B.I. lured a Lebanese national named
Fawaz Younis onto a yacht and transported him by force to the U.S. for
trial. His abduction was based upon his suspected involvement in a 1985
hijacking of Jordanian airliner at a Beirut airport in which U.S. nationals had
been held hostage."
On the second issue, under international law there is normally a very
substantial difference between abduction of a terrorist or other hostes humani
generis and abduction of any head of state. Indeed, there is almost always
a presumption of sovereign immunity, a binding rule that exempts each state
and its high officials from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. Although
the rule of sovereign immunity is certainly not absolute in the post-Nurem-
berg world order, the right of one state to seize a high official from another
state is exceedingly limited. In an 1812 case before the Supreme Court of
the United States, 2 Chief Justice Marshall went even further, arguing for
"the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention within
a foreign territory." 3 Nevertheless, where the alleged crimes in question
are of a Nuremberg-category and no other means exist whereby to gain
custody of the pertinent head of state, the expectations of nullum crimen sine
poena (no crime without a punishment) may override those of sovereign
immunity.
Exactly what kinds of Iraqi crimes are involved? Judging from persistent
and well-documented reports of horrendous crimes, 4 crimes so terrible in
law that they mandate universal cooperation in apprehension and punish-
ment1" (what the lawyers call crimen contra omnes, crimes against all), they
9. See Walcott & Pasztor, Reagan Ruling to Let CIA Kidnap Terrorists Overseas is
Disclosed, The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1984).
11. See Schuetz, Apprehending Terrorists Overseas Under United States and International
Law: A Case Study of the Fawaz Younis Arrest, 29 HARv. INT'L L.J. 499, 501 (1988).
12. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
13. Id. at 137.
14. A Letter from Kuwait, New York Times, Jan. 14, 1991, at A17, col. 1; and Human
Rights Abuses in Kuwait and Iraq, Hearings, Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
102nd Cong., 1st Sess. Jan 8, 1991.
15. The principle of universality is founded upon the presumption of solidarity between States
in the fight against crimes. It is mentioned in the Corpus Juris Civilis; in H. Grotius' De jure
belli ac pais Book II, Chapter XX (1625); and in E. Vattel's Le droit des gens Book I, Chapter
XIX (1758). The case for universal jurisdiction (which is strengthened wherever extradition is
difficult or impossible to obtain) is also built into the four Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, which unambiguously impose upon the High Contracting Parties the obligation to punish
certain grave breaches of their rules, regardless of where the infraction was committed or the
nationality of the authors of the crimes, See art. 49; art. 50; art. 129; and art. 146. In further
support of universality for certain international crimes see M.C. BASSIOUNI, 2 INTERNATIONAL
4
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concern (1) barbarous and inhuman assaults against the people of Kuwait and
other nationals in Kuwait; (2) barbarous and inhuman treatment of coalition
prisoners of war in Iraq and Kuwait; and (3) aggression and crimes of war
against noncombatant populations in Israel and Saudi Arabia. All of these
violations under international law,1" of course, are in addition to the original
crimes against peace committed against Kuwait on August 2, 1990.17
Washington and its allies must also decide on how broadly they wish to
prosecute Iraqi crimes. In this respect, the special post World War II war
crimes planning group had a somewhat easier task, focusing primarily on
particular Nazi groups that were defined as inherently criminal (e.g., the SS
and the Gestapo). Following the defeat of Saddam Hussein, however, it
EXTRADITION IN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE Chapter 6 (1983). See also Restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Tentative Draft No. 2, (1984), §§ 402-404, 443
(1984) and 18 U.S.C. § 6(c) (1948).
16. It has been argued that the rationale for protection of human rights violations under
international law is that "certain forms of depredations become matters of international concern
when committed under the aegis of state policy because of the presumed international impact of
such behavior." See Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of International Law in the Processes
of International Protection of Human Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 193, 194 (1982).
In my view, however, this rationale is independent of international implications whenever the
depredations in question outrage the conscience of humankind. International law now concedes
that limits to the omnipotence of each State are determined not only by the requirements of
international comity, but by the inherent rights of each individual person to claims of human life
and dignity. The jurisprudential bases of this concession may be found in all of the sources of
international law identified at Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, art.
38, 59 stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N 1052.
17. For crimes against peace, or waging aggressive war, see Resolution of the Definition of
Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1975), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710 (1974). For pertinent codifications of the criminalization of
aggression, see also The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact Know generally as the "Pact of Paris" Treaty
Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,(Pact of Paris) Aug.
27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 U.N.T.S. 57; U.N. Charter art. 2(4), Charter of the
United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 2 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N.
1043; the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 374 (1966);
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971); Declaration on the Non-use of Force
in International Relations and Permanent Prohibition on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res.
2936, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); and the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, supra note 7. Resolution Affirming the Principles of
International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N.
Doe. A/236, at 1144 (1946). See also Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26,
1933, arts. 8, 10-11, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (known generally as the
"Montevideo Convention"); Pact of the League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, art. 5, 70
U.N.T.S. 237, 39 A.J.I.L. Supp. 266; Charter of the Organization of American States, Chs.
II, IV, V, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 and Protocol of
Amendment, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847721 U.N.T.S.(known generally
as the "Protocol of Buenos Aires"); Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2,
1947, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838 4 Bevans 559 21 U.N.T.S., (known generally as the
"Rio Pact"); the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, April 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55 U.S.
not a party rule 19.25 (b) (known generally as the "Pact of Bogota"); and the Charter of the
Organization of the African Unity, May 25, 1963, arts. II, III, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, reprinted in
2 I.L.M. 766 (1963).
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appears that most of the crimes against humanity committed by Iraq were
unplanned and individually-conceived atrocities."' This means that the
coalition lists of suspected war criminals could become so large as to be
altogether unusable. Alternatively, coalition prosecution could focus
essentially or even entirely on Saddam Hussein and his leadership elite, ajudicial strategy that would permit many or all rank-and-file Iraqi criminals
to avoid punishment, but would at least stand some chance of far-reaching
and practical success.19
18. This does not mean, however, that if these crimes were planned and directed by Iraqi
military authorities, individuals soldiers could plead "superior orders" in their defense. With
respect to the issue of superior orders, the classical writers on international law had long rejected
that doctrine as a proper defense against the charge of war crimes. The German Code of
Military Law operative during the war provided that a soldier must execute all orders undeterred
by the fear of legal consequences, but it added that this would not excuse him in cases where
he must have known with certainty that the order was illegal. This view was upheld in an
important decision of the German Supreme Court in Leipzig in 1921. According to the Court,
a subordinate who obeyed the order of a superior officer was liable to punishment if it were
known to him that such an order involved a contravention of international law.
The London Charter, supra note 7, which established jurisdiction and authority for the
Nuremberg Tribunal, observed in articles 7 and 8 that "superior orders" were not to be
considered by the Tribunal as freeing defendants from responsibility:
The very essence of the Charter is that individuals have international duties which
transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual States.
He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance
of the authority of the State if the State in authorizing action moves outside its
competence under international law.
These principles of international law were recognized by the Affirmation of the Principles of
International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N.
Doc. A/236 at 1144 (1946). This was followed by General Assembly Resolution 177 (II), which
directed the U.N. International Law Commission to "(a) Formulate the principles of international
law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal,
and (b) Prepare a draft code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind. . . ." G.A.
Res. 177 (II), U.N. Doc. A/519 at 112. (1946). The principles formulated are known as the
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg
Tribunal. Report of the International Law Commission, 2nd session, 1950, U.N. GAOR 5th
session, Supp. No. 12, A/1316, p. 11. According to Principle IV: "The fact that a person acted
pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility
under international law."
19. The liability of Saddam Hussein and his ruling associates for crimes committed under
international law is well established in the principle of respondeat superior. Literally "Let the
master answer," this principle is the converse of the doctrine of "superior orders," and is
designed to ensure that obedience to authority by subordinates entails no criminal consequences.
Moreover, the superior's responsibility extends to situations even where no affirmative orders
to commit crimes have been given. Paragraph 501 of the U.S. Field Manual 27-10, Department
of the Army, Department of the Army Field Manual 27-10: The Law of Land Warfare § 501
and § 510 (1956), based on the judgment over Japanese General Tomayuki Yamashita-stipu-
lates that any commander who had actual knowledge, or should have had knowledge, that troops
or other persons under his control were complicit in war crimes and failed to take necessary
steps to protect the laws of war was guilty of a war crime. Paragraph 510 denies the defense
of "act of state" to such alleged criminals by providing that though a person who committed an
act constituting an international crime may have acted as head of state or as a responsible
government official, he is not relieved, thereby, from responsibility for that act. This paragraph,
of course, is drawn from Principle III of Principles of International Law Recognized in the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal (1946; known
commonly as "The Nuremberg Principles") and in the formulation of these principles by the
6
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The United States has slowly backed off from President Bush's intra-war
plans for trials of Saddam Hussein and his military leadership.' The
principle reason for this diminished enthusiasm lies in geopolitical factors,
especially the fear that the U.S.-led prosecution would not play well- in the
Arab world. In the U.S. Congress, certain individual members have argued
for appropriate trials. 1
Finally, it should be noted that a coalition agency charged with creating
"another Nuremberg" could adopt the solution favored by the United States,
the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France in 1945. Here, a specially-
created tribunal would be established for the trial of major criminals (that is,
Saddam Hussein and the surviving members of his Revolutionary Council)
while the domestic courts of individual coalition countries would provide the
venue for trials of "minor" criminals (that is, of ordinary soldiers and their
civilian collaborators). As in the distinction employed to prosecute Nazi
offenses, the separation of major and minor criminals concerns matters of
rank or position, and would have nothing to do with the seriousness or
horror of particular transgressions. Moreover, because the Iraqi crimes make
their perpetrators "common enemies of mankind" under international law,
every country now has the legal right to prosecute these crimes in its own
courtrooms.'
The crimes committed by Iraq are reminiscent of Nazi crimes of an earlier
International Law Commission (1950), supra note 18.
20. See Barrett, U.S. Backs Off Iraqi War Crimes Trials Due to Logistic, Political
Considerations, The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 25, 1991, at 13, 14.
21. In a letter from Tom Lantos to Louis Rene Beres, May 15, 1991, discussing Iraqi War
Crimes, Representative Tom Lantos of California stated: "I feel strongly that Saddam should be
brought before an international tribunal to answer for his brutal crimes against the civilized
world." Similarly, Representative Lee H. Hamilton of Indiana, wrote "There is considerable
interest in the U.S. Congress regarding the issue of Iraqi war crimes and how Saddam Hussein
and others in his regime may be made to account for their actions in the Persian Gulf War. As
long as Saddam Hussein remains in power in Baghdad, the international community has few
options short of another invasion of Iraq for bringing him and his officers to justice.
Nevertheless, it is my expectation that Saddam's days in power will be numbered and the issue
of prosecution for war crimes will be with us for some time to come." Letter from Lee H.
Hamilton to Louis Ren6 Beres (August 7, 1991) (discussing Iraqi War Crimes).
22. A. contemporary example is that of Israel. Recognizing that genociders are common
enemies of mankind and that no authoritative central institutions exist to apprehend such outlaws
or to judge them as a penal tribunal, Israel sought to uphold the antigenocide norms of
international law in its trial of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi functionary of German or Austrian
nationality. Indicted under Israel's Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law, Eichmann was
convicted and executed after the judgment was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Israel on
appeal in 1962. See 36 INT'L L. REP. 5 (Israel, Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961). Affirmed Israel
Supreme Court, 36 INT'L L. REP. 277, 342 (1962). Genocide is a crime against humanity with
precise jurisprudential meaning. It identifies as criminal any of a series of stipulated acts
'committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group
as such . . . " Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 3, art. II.
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era, and warrant similar forms of trial and punishment z' Now is the time
for the U.S. and its partners to establish the necessary legal machinery.
23. In terms of the possibility of using domestic courts to uphold international law, the
example of the United States may be of particular interest. Since its founding, the United States
has reserved the right to enforce international law within its own courts. Article I, Section I,
Clause 10 of the American Constitution confers on Congress the power "to define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations."
Pursuant to this constitutional prerogative, the first Congress, in 1789, passed the Alien Tort
Statute. This statute authorizes United States federal courts to hear those civil claims by aliens
alleging acts committed "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States" when
the alleged wrongdoers can be found in the United States. At that time, of course, the particular
target of this legislation was piracy on the high seas. Over the years, United States federal
courts have rarely invoked the "law of nations," and then only in such cases where the acts in
question had already been proscribed by treaties or conventions. In 1979, a case seeking
damages for foreign acts of torture was filed in the federal courts. In a complaint filed jointly
with his daughter, Dolly, Dr. Joel Filartiga, a well-known Paraguayan physician and artist and
an opponent of President Alfredo Stroessner's repressive regime, alleged that members of that
regime's police force had tortured and murdered his son, Joelito. On June 30, 1980, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that since an international consensus condemning torture
had crystallized, torture violates the "law of nations" for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute.
United States courts, it was held, therefore have jurisdiction under the statute to hear civil suits
by the victims of foreign torture, if the alleged international outlaws are found in the United
States. See The Alien Tort Claims Act 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). The statute was enacted as
part of the first Judiciary Act of 1789, I Stat. 73, 77 (1848). See also the 1980 U.S. federal
appellate case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). There is an ironic
dichotomy in U.S. law here. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the second circuit held that the Alien
Tort Claims Act provides a basis for aliens to bring actions in U.S. federal courts for torts
committed in violation of the law of nations. Yet, a district court's holding in another recent
case, Handel v. Artukovic, means that U.S. citizens lack the private right to sue for violations
of the law of nations. Thus, U.S. federal courts appear to have jurisdiction to hear the claims
of aliens more readily than they do the claims of U.S. citizens. See Handel v. Artukovic, 601
F. Supp. 1421 (C.D.Cal. 1985). In this case, plaintiffs, U.S. citizens, brought a class action
seeking compensatory and punitive damages against defendants for his alleged involvement in
the deprivations of life and property suffered by Jews in occupied Yugoslavia during World War
II.
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